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When philosophers discuss our
motive for acting morally, they
tend to assume that it serves as
one contributor to the broad
conflux of motives that jointly
determine most of our behav-
ior. Although philosophers rec-
ognize the possibility of our being divided into mutually isolated motivational
currents of the sort posited, at the extreme, to explain phenomena such as mul-
tiple personality, they assume that our moral motive must not be thus divided
from our other motives, lest its manifestations in our behavior turn out to be irra-
tional and, at the extreme, insane. Their assumption is that the actions flowing
from our moral motive must in fact flow from a unified stream of all our motives,
augmented by a moral tributary.
This assumption influences which questions are asked about moral motiva-
tion and which answers are considered plausible. The assumption encourages
philosophers to ask, for example, how to identify our moral motive among the
impulses that pass under the eye of ordinary deliberative reflection, and how that
motive can possibly prevail against the impulses that so conspicuously favor
immorality.
I am going to argue that the motive behind moral actions can become isolat-
ed from our other motives, generating behavior that is irrational in some respects
though rational in others. In my view, moral action performed from moral
motives can be less than fully rational precisely because of the division in its moti-
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Abstract
I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My
account suggests that although emulating an ideal is
often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things.
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vation. The reason why moral motivation can become isolated from our other
motives, I shall argue, is that it often depends on the force of an ideal; an ideal
gains motivational force when we identify with it; and acting out of identification
with an ideal is like a game of make-believe, in which we pretend to be that with
which we identify. My argument will begin, then, with a consideration of adult
make-believe. 
For many years, I regularly kicked my wife in the head. We were studying Tae
Kwon Do, and we often found ourselves paired together in drills or sparring.
There we stood, high-school sweethearts from the sixties, each apparently trying
to knock the other’s block off.
What is the motivational explanation for such behavior? The motives most
obviously actuating me in the circumstances were my desires to enhance my car-
diovascular fitness and to have some fun in the process. But surely there would
be something odd about saying that I kicked my wife in the head in order to
lower my cholesterol or just for fun. Of course, I knew – or, at least, hoped – that
my wife would suffer no harm. She was wearing a foam helmet, I was wearing
padded footgear, and I didn’t strike with all of my strength. You might think, in
fact, that I didn’t so much kick her in the head as do something else that was only
superficially similar, such as tap her on the temple with my toe. Such a tap could
indeed have been produced by many motives of mine, including affection. Yet to
say that I was trying to deliver a tap would misrepresent the encounter: a pulled
punch or kick may feel like a tap to the recipient, but it is in fact quite dissimi-
lar, since it is thrown with full force and “pulled” only in the sense of being aimed
to fall short. 
What calls for further explanation is not so much the fact that I kicked my
wife on these occasions as the spirit in which I did so. For one thing, the effort
behind my kicks was disproportionate to the motives that led me to the activity
of sparring. The desires and beliefs that militated for kicking my wife may well
have been stronger than the desires and beliefs that militated against, but not by
enough of a margin to account for the zeal with which I went at her. Shouldn’t
effort be proportionate to motivation?
Then there is the manner of my kicks, which also seems to require further
explanation. One and the same gross movement can evince different motives
through subtle differences of posture, timing, muscle tension, and body english.
The kicks that I aimed at my wife did not have the inflection of calisthenics or
soccer or dance; they had the inflection of combat.  
The key to explaining these aspects of my behavior, I think, is that Tae Kwon
Do had helped me to solve a familiar motivational problem. The effort that one
must expend in order to stay fit tends to require more motivation than can be
supplied by one’s desire for fitness: that’s why so many exercise programs fail. If
one wants to stay fit, one needs to find some additional source of motivation to
draw on. Some forms of exercise give one access to competitiveness as an addi-
tional motive, others to team spirit, a love of nature, or musical inspiration. My
additional source of motivation in Tae Kwon Do was aggression, and aggression
is what accounted for the energy and inflection of my kicks. 
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Reflection on this case convinces me that there must be some truth in Freud’s the-
ory of the drives. What’s true in that theory, I think, is the postulation of highly
labile psychic energies, which have only a vague direction in themselves but can
be invested in specific activities.1
In studying Tae Kwon Do, I discovered that I had a fund of aggression to
spend on kicks and punches, whether they were aimed at a leather bag, a hand-
held target, or a person’s head. This aggression is not best characterized in terms
of desire and belief. I did not enter the do jang wanting to smash something and
looking for something to smash: rough contact with medium-sized objects was
not something I desired at all. But it was something for which I found a consid-
erable reserve of energy, in the form of aggression; and that aggression could be
turned on virtually any solid object, including any person who happened to be
my assigned opponent.
I am similarly inclined to believe in a drive corresponding roughly to the
Freudian libido. We sometimes describe a person as having a lot of love to give
but nowhere to give it. Such a person has a fund of tenderness that could poten-
tially be spent on a lover, a child, a cat, even a garden or a scrapbook. In this case,
unspent energy may be experienced as frustration, and so the person may devel-
op a desire for someone or something to love. But such a desire need not devel-
op; and even when it does, it remains distinct from the fund of energy whose dis-
bursement it seeks. The person’s desire for someone or something to love is a con-
tingent reaction to his unspent tenderness, not an essential constituent of it.
I realize that talk of psychic energies will strike philosophical readers as intol-
erably metaphorical. In principle, the metaphor can be eliminated in favor of con-
cepts drawn from propositional-attitude psychology: we can conceive of ag-
gression as a conative attitude whose object is picked out by a mental represen-
tation of some kind. But we shall then be forced to conceive of this representa-
tion either as radically indeterminate in content or as playing a non-standard
role;2 and the resulting conception of aggression will not lend itself to the kind of
formalization that has so endeared propositional-attitude psychology to philoso-
phers ever since Aristotle discovered the practical syllogism.
On the one hand, if we think of aggression as motivating the pursuit of, and
being temporarily quelled by, the literal truth of the associated representation, then
we shall have to say that the representation is far too vague to be expressed in the
concepts with which we consciously reason, or the terms in which we write and
speak. There is no finite “that” clause of ordinary language that will suffice to speci-
fy the pursuits or satisfactions in which aggression can eventuate. If, on the other
hand, we insist on framing a written or spoken “that” clause to express the content
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of aggression, we shall have to concede that what the attitude can motivate someone
towards, or be satisfied by, includes not only the literal truth of the clause but also
indefinitely many other outcomes related only by analogy, by metaphorical similari-
ty, or by other mental associations of an open-ended variety. Either way, proposi-
tional-attitude psychology will not afford the same computational advantages in this
case as it does in the case of ordinary beliefs and desires, whose tendencies to moti-
vate and to be satisfied can be summed up in sentences of ordinary language.        
Thus, we can accommodate drives within the basic principles of proposition-
al attitude psychology, but only by allowing for a level of mental representation,
or a mechanism of motivation, that eludes capture by the explanation schemas
characteristic of that theory. The metaphor of psychic energies is a useful
reminder that, even if all motives are propositional attitudes in principle, some
have motivational possibilities that cannot practically be formalized in spoken or
written propositions. 
Another idea that I want to borrow from Freud is that drives can take on a
specific direction by “leaning” on some other, more specific motive. According to
Freud, the infantile libido leans on and takes direction from the motive of hun-
ger, with the result that the nutritive activity of sucking becomes a source of sen-
sual pleasure, and the breast becomes a sexual object. Similarly, I think, aggres-
sion can take direction from more specific motives, such as professional ambition
or athletic competitiveness. Aggressive energy is then invested in professional or
athletic pursuits, which in turn take on an aggressive character. 
The spirit of my kicks in Tae Kwon Do can thus be explained by the aggression
from which they drew some of their motivation. Yet the explanation can hardly
end here. The aggressiveness of my kicks was not like the aggressiveness of my
driving, for example, which emerges without my knowledge and even despite my
efforts to contain it. The aggressiveness of my kicks was knowing and intention-
al, because I was engaged in a fight. And yet I had no motives for, and many
motives against, literally fighting my opponents. I was behaving aggressively in
this case because I was engaged in fictional aggression, and so an explanation of
my behavior requires an account of the operative fiction.
A martial art typically relies on a story – indeed, on a story-within-a-story,
especially for students in the West. The “inner” story is a story of combat. At the
founding of the discipline, this story may have been about combat on the battle-
field, but in the modern do jang it is often about being attacked on the proverbial
street. Some students have actually lived through a version of this story, especially
women who seek out the martial arts after surviving rape or domestic abuse. But
even these students train under a fiction, insofar as they are not really being
attacked by their fellow students.
The “outer” story of a martial art, which is usually a fiction only for beginning
students and then only briefly, is that they are devotees of a venerable tradition,
transmitted to them by a revered master and shared with others in a spirit of
humility and mutual self-restraint. The beginning student acts out this story be-
fore it can possibly be true of him, by bowing to his instructor and fellow stu-
dents, calling them “Sir” and “Ma’am,” wearing ritual garments and reciting ritu-
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al phrases, all from the first moment of the first class. For some students this story
always remains a fiction, in the sense that they are never more than playing at par-
ticipation in the tradition; but for most it soon becomes a true story, and the
phrases of Korean or Japanese that were at first only mouthed come to be sin-
cerely meant. 
The inner and outer stories of a martial art are in direct conflict. The ferocity
with which one tries to disable or kill an attacker, according to the inner story, is
the very opposite of the humble deference that, according to the outer story, one
owes to the instructor who may be playing the attacker’s role. This conflict is vivid-
ly demonstrated when someone is injured in competitive sparring. The competi-
tor responsible for the injury, who a moment ago seemed intent on bloody mur-
der, suddenly kneels with his back to his opponent, in a posture of passivity and
penitence, because he has drawn a single drop of blood. The fiction of combat is
instantly dispelled, leaving only the outer story of deferential self-restraint.
This scene illustrates two further claims that I want to make about motivation, in
addition to my prior claim on behalf of drives. The first of these further claims is
that our motives are often manifested in our behavior under the guidance of a
story: how we act on them is determined by the story that we are enacting.
The most ambitious version of this claim, which I have defended elsewhere,
is that all of our autonomous actions are the enactments of stories, most of which
are true but all of which are made up.3 At any particular time we have motives
for taking various actions, and the action we take is usually the one whose story
we have in mind to enact. We are therefore in a position to make up the story of
our behavior as we go, in the assurance that we’ll behave accordingly, provided
that we confine ourselves to stories whose enactment could be fueled by motives
that we actually have. And the story that we make up is true, not only in that we
proceed to enact it, but also in that it represents our action as its own enactment
– as the action that we are hereby setting ourselves to take.
My view is that this process depends on a motive that is almost always in the
background, and rarely in the foreground, of our autonomous actions: the desire
to make sense of what we’re doing. This desire moves us to take actions that make
sense to us, and the actions that make sense are the ones about which we have a
story to tell. Thus, although we ultimately do what is favored by the overall bal-
ance of our motives, that balance has often been tipped by the inclusion of our
motive for doing things that make sense to us – a motive that is purely formal and
does not appear in our conscious story of what we’re doing. That story may tell of
other motives in light of which the action makes sense to us; but we perform the
action not only out of those narrated motives but also out of our motive for mak-
ing sense, which is enlisted by the availability of the narrative itself.
When a story renders an action intelligible to us, it becomes a rationale for the
J. David Velleman
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action. And when we are thereby led to perform the action, as the intelligible
thing to do, we act on the basis of the story in its capacity as rationale. In other
words, we act for a reason.
Thus, when I entered the do jang on a particular evening, I thought of myself
as continuing my martial arts training, which I thought of myself as pursuing for
the sake of cardiovascular fitness and fun. These thoughts were not just an idle
commentary on my behavior; they constituted a story that I was in the process of
enacting, with actions that I would not have taken in the absence of a story to tell
about them. That I was seeking to continue my training out of desires for fitness
and fun – that story was the rationale under which I entered the do jang. It was
my reason for walking in the door.  
Yet when I kicked an opponent in Tae Kwon Do, the story I enacted wasn’t true,
since it was a story of fending off a mortal attack. My behavior was therefore an
enactment in the thespian sense – or, if you like, a game of make-believe.
I have argued elsewhere that the term ‘make-believe’ means “mock-belief,”
because it refers to a fantasy or imagining that stands in for a belief by playing its
motivational role.4 My examples on that occasion were primarily imaginings that
play the role of ordinary instrumental beliefs – such as the belief that I can com-
municate with someone by speaking to him, which is ordinarily one of the
motives behind my verbal behavior. When I address remarks to other drivers on
the road, however, or to the referees of a sporting event on television, I am not
moved by the belief that I can thereby communicate with them; I’m moved in-
stead by imagining that I can. Because imagining here plays the motivational role
of a belief, it qualifies as “mock-belief,” and I can be described as making believe.
I’m making believe that I can communicate with these people, by acting on a
mock-belief to that effect.
In the present context, I want to consider imaginings that substitute for beliefs
in a slightly different motivational role. If I really believed myself to be under
attack, that belief would serve as a narrative premise under which some courses
of action would make sense and others would not, and I would be guided accord-
ingly as I improvised my part in the encounter. Strictly speaking, this belief would
be functioning as an instrumental motive, since it would influence me by causing
some steps but not others to appear intelligible and hence conducive to making
sense of what I do, which is a desired outcome. But this outcome is not an end-
in-view – not, that is, an end-in-the-story, something whose pursuit I would
enact. It’s just something that I want, conduciveness to which makes actions
attractive to me. And what it makes attractive to me, in particular, are actions
about which I have a story to tell.
I think that fantasy and imagining can play this motivational role as well.
When I imagined that I was facing an attack in Tae Kwon Do, I was thereby led
to imagine some steps as making sense and others as making none, and I was
guided accordingly as I improvised my part in the ensuing fights – make-believe
fights, guided by a mock-belief. I then enacted a story that was fictional in every
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sense, since it was not only made up but also untrue. 
Part of the story, of course, was that I fought out of a desire to disable or kill
my opponent, and in reality I didn’t have any such desire to draw on. What I
drew on instead, I have argued, is a labile fund of aggression, which leaned in this
case, not on any desire to harm my opponent, but on the motivational force lent
to the story itself by my inclination to do what made sense in light of that story.
I may actually have imagined the felt thrust of aggression to be a desire to harm
my opponent, much as I was obliged, in self-defense drills, to imagine wooden
batons to be knives. (In that case, my aggression served as a “prop,” in the sense
defined by Kendall L. Walton.)5 In reality, however, my aggression’s being focused
upon my opponent was due to my conceiving of it as a desire to harm him, rather
than the other way around. That is, imagining it as a desire to harm my opponent
lent intelligibility to the act of kicking, thus giving me a motive for kicking, on
which my aggression could lean.  
The game of make-believe was thus fueled by two elements – a drive and an
imagining – and the game would fail if either element was missing. Some students
of the martial arts don’t have much aggression to draw on, and they consequent-
ly aren’t fully equipped to play the game. Merely imagining that they are under
attack isn’t enough to make them fight, in the absence of a drive that could sup-
ply the force of their imagined desires with respect to an attacker. So their threat-
ening yells always sound like peeps, and their blows really are no more than taps.
Other students seem to have sufficient aggression but to be inhibited from enter-
ing into the requisite make-believe, at least in some circumstances. For example,
some men simply can’t bring themselves to imagine that they are trying to kill or
disable a woman. Though capable of fighting other opponents aggressively, they
can’t muster the imagining that would bring their aggression to bear on these
opponents, and so they merely go through the motions. 
Of course, none of us actually tried to kill or disable an opponent. We were re-
strained by our sense of mutual respect and deference. But I do not think that the
motive of deference simply combined with aggression to yield an intermediate
vector-sum – a deferential aggression, or aggressive deference, or whatever. To
pull a punch is not simply to strike at half-strength, out of some lukewarm mix-
ture of hot and cold motives. This is my second of my further claims about moti-
vation.
In making this claim, I do not mean to reject the principle that a person’s
behavior flows from the combined force of his motives; I mean only to point out
that, because of the motivational force exerted by an agent’ self-conception, there
are two distinct ways in which his other motives can combine.
One way requires the agent to think of himself as acting on both motives at
once and hence to be guided, not only by their combined forces, but also by his
conception of how those forces combine. In this case, the agent is consciously
engaged in a mixed activity – restrained hostilities, or perhaps hostile self-
restraint. The agent’s behavior is determined partly by the combined forces of his
motives and partly by his conception of what would make sense for him to do in
J. David Velleman
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light of their combination, his story of how he is acting on both at once. 
Another way for motives to combine is for the agent to conceive of himself as
acting on only one of them, while the other tacitly modifies this activity. Thus, for
example, an agent’s desire to avoid bodily harm steers him away from obstacles
even when he is single-mindedly engaged in vigorous activity and not conscious-
ly exercising caution. What makes for the difference between these two ways of
mixing motives is the motivational role of the agent’s self-conception, which is not
epiphenomenal on his behavior, not just an idle commentary. In one case, the
agent deliberately acts on both motives, by enacting a story of both; in the other
case, the agent enacts the story of one motive, while this enactment is subject to
unheralded modification by the other. 
When we think about the mixing of motives, we usually have the former
process in mind, because we assume that people are simultaneously aware of the
various motives vying for control of their behavior. We may therefore assume that
if students of the martial arts are both mutually deferential and mutually hostile,
they must conceive of themselves in both terms at the same time. But such a con-
flicted self-conception would result in sparring that could only be described as
half-assed. In fact, students imagine themselves entirely as hostile opponents
while they are sparring, but this role is externally constrained by their deferential
motives as colleagues.
Consider what happens when a participant in make-believe gets “carried
away”. Sometimes students do get carried away in sparring, especially new stu-
dents who haven’t yet learned how to manage the conflicting stories that they are
supposed to enact. The reason why it’s possible to get carried away, I think, is that
a participant in make-believe puts his real identity and his real relations to other
participants temporarily out of mind. In order to enact his fictional identity and
his fictional relations to others, he must devote his mind to the fiction. In doing
so, however, he trusts that the motives he has put out of mind will nevertheless
hold him back from excesses, or will pull him up short if things get out of hand.
His knowledge of who the participants really are, and his inclinations toward
those real people, are motives that stand by and supervise, as it were, either by
setting boundaries to the game of make-believe, within which they are not in
view, or by forcing their way into view and breaking up the game, if it goes too
far. The agent gets carried away when this external supervision fails and the game
proceeds headlong, without either restraint or interruption. 
Getting carried away often leads to irrational action. When someone gets carried
away in a philosophical debate, for example, he presses his point at the expense
of other people’s feelings and his own reputation for collegiality, both of which he
cares about, on balance, more than the question under dispute. In some cases, of
course, intellectual enthusiasm may have blinded the agent to the undesirable
consequences of his behavior; but in others, he sees those consequences yet
presses on with the argument regardless.
From the agent’s point-of-view, his motives may appear to wax and wane as
circumstances change. In the heat of the argument, the prospect of securing his
point consumes all of his attention and interest; whereas in a cooler moment, the
philosophical point may seem unimportant. But this introspectable change need
97
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not be a change in the agent’s desires themselves; it may instead be a change as to
which desire is reinforced by the agent’s conception of what he is doing. In the
heat of the argument, the agent thinks of himself exclusively as pressing his point,
and this self-conception provides reinforcement exclusively to his motives for
doing so. Even if the agent notices the annoyance of his interlocutor, he doesn’t
think of it as something that he is currently wants to avoid or to mitigate. Man-
aging his relations with colleagues is not something toward which he thinks of
himself as currently motivated, and so his potential motives for that activity are
not bolstered by his interest in self-understanding.
These motives are nevertheless present, and as I have suggested, they have
two chances to prevent him from getting carried away, corresponding to the two
ways in which motives can combine. First, the desire for good relations with col-
leagues can leave the agent’s pursuit of the argument uninterrupted while
restraining it from the outside, in the same way as the desire to avoid bodily harm
restrains his physical activities even when he isn’t deliberately being cautious.
And then, if unreflective restraint fails, the agent’s desire for good relations with
colleagues can obtrude itself on his attention, so that his concentration on the
argument is broken and he comes to think of himself, under the circumstances,
as having more than one end at stake.
These modes of restraint look quite different, both from the agent’s perspec-
tive and from the perspective of observers. Some philosophers can throw them-
selves into an argument without fear of giving offense, because they will be unre-
flectively restrained from going too far. These philosophers are said to trust them-
selves in the heat of an argument, where the “selves” they trust are not reflective
selves who might be trusted to make the right choice in deliberation but rather
motives that can be trusted to restrain them without reflection or deliberation.
Other philosophers never fully commit themselves to the point they’re trying to
make, because they are busy monitoring the expressions of their listeners and
interjecting polite qualifications. Because they can’t rely on their collegial motives
for implicit restraint, they must explicitly adopt self-restraint as an additional
activity whenever they get into an argument.
The same contrast applies to participants in the martial arts. If a student can’t
trust himself in sparring, he must consciously ride two horses at once, both his
aggression and his self-restraint. If a student can trust himself, then he can ride
his aggression wholeheartedly and count on his self-restraint to run alongside on
its own. If the latter strategy fails, the student may be forced to adopt the former
– not exactly to switch horses in midstream but to shift part of his weight onto
the second horse. And part of what he counted on from his self-restraint, at the
outset, was that it would force itself into his activity in this manner if it failed to
steer him adequately from the outside. 
Both forms of restraint are exemplified in an agent’s behavior most of the time.
Because moments of true single-mindedness are rare, an agent is often con-
sciously multi-tasking, and yet he is also influenced by additional motives that
remain out of view. Bustling down the street on several errands at once, he im-
plicitly trusts himself not to step into potholes or bowl over fellow pedestrians –
which is to say, he knows that various latent motives of his will either restrain his
conscious pursuits or interrupt them if tacit restraint should fail. 
J. David Velleman
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An agent’s self-conception thus separates his motives into two groups. One group
comprises motives that the agent manifests in the process of consciously enacting
them; the other comprises motives that manifest themselves primarily by exter-
nally modifying such enactments. The former are the motivational horses that the
agent is riding, as I have put it, and the latter are relegated to the role of hemming
him in or cutting him off as necessary.
The process becomes further complicated if the agent imagines himself to
have motives that he doesn’t actually have. The agent may be moved to enact this
imaginative self-conception, especially if he has motivational resources that can
mimic the force of the imagined motives, such as aggression that can be focussed
onto a particular person by being conceived as a desire to kill or disable him. The
agent’s actual motives are then divided into those on which he is acting under a
mistaken or imaginary guise, and those which are relegated to hemming in or cut-
ting off that game of make-believe. 
An extreme form of this motivational division may account for various disso-
ciative phenomena, such as multiple personality disorder (or dissociative identi-
ty disorder, as it is now called). What seem like distinct personalities may in fact
be distinct self-conceptions enacted by the agent at different times. The self-con-
ceptions involved in DID would have to differ in various respects from ordinary
self-conceptions, including those involved in make-believe. They would have to
be full-blown delusions – that is, conscious fantasies not recognized as such by
the agent – and they would have to resist external restraint or interruption to the
point that the agent had no access to the motives that he wasn’t currently enact-
ing. The resulting division in the agent’s motives would be deeper than that in the
motives of a sane and sober agent. But it would be a deeper version of the same
fundamental division, between the motives that are being enacted and the
motives that can at most modify that enactment. 
As we have seen, this division in an agent’s motives can lead to action that is irra-
tional in relation to the totality of his desires and interests, as when it lets him get
carried away in a debate, to his subsequent regret. But I think that the temporary
irrationality of getting carried away can sometimes be exploited for more perma-
nent gains in rationality. For an agent can get carried away with the better of his
motives as well as the worse.
A colleague who studies rational choice tells me that he could never have quit
smoking without indulging in some irrationality.6 Although the long-run costs of
smoking outweighed the long-run benefits, he says, the costs of smoking the next
cigarette never outweighed the benefits of smoking that one cigarette, since he
could always decide to quit after the next cigarette rather than before. In order to
stop smoking in the long run, of course, he had to forego the next cigarette at
some point, at an obvious sacrifice of utility. The only way for him to stop was
thus to do something irrational. How did he manage to do it?
The answer, he tells me, was not to think of himself as a smoker. At the begin-
ning, of course, not to think of himself as a smoker was incorrect, since he was
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still addicted to smoking, both physically and psychologically. I suggest, then,
that he resorted to make-believe. He imagined that he was not addicted – that he
didn’t like the taste of cigarettes, wasn’t in the habit of smoking them, had no
craving for them – and he then enacted what he was imagining, pretending to be
the non-smoker that he wanted to be. And I suggest that this make-believe suc-
ceeded because it excluded the smoker’s tastes, habits, and cravings from the
story that he was enacting. That story lacked the narrative background that would
have made it intelligible for him to buy, light, or smoke the next cigarette.
I suggest, further, that my colleague got carried away with this make-believe,
and that getting carried away was essential to his success at kicking the habit. His
motives for smoking were relegated to externally constraining his enactment of a
non-smoker’s story. Those motives had proved irresistible when they were avail-
able at center-stage to motivate the next episode in the story; but when they were
written out of the plot and left to operate, as it were, ex machina, they were unable
to deflect the story from its natural conclusion.
I suggest, finally, that when my colleague got carried away with enacting an
image of himself as a non-smoker, he was being motivated by an ideal. That’s
what an ideal is: the image of another person, or a currently untrue image of one-
self, that one can get carried away with enacting.7 To imagine oneself in that
image, and to act accordingly, is to identify with and emulate the ideal. 
An alternative to my conception of ideals would be to think of them as descrip-
tions or images that motivate by way of one’s desire to satisfy them and one’s real-
istic beliefs about how to do so. According to this alternative conception, taking
another person as one’s ideal entails wanting to resemble him, which directly
motivates behavior like his, conceived as a constitutive means to the desired
resemblance. I doubt whether the motivational force of an ideal can flow direct-
ly from such a desire.8
Suppose that one idealizes a person for his generosity and wants to resemble
him in this respect.9 Insofar as this desire directly moves one to do generous
things, those acts will not in fact be motivated by generosity, after all, and so one’s
attempted imitation of the ideal will be an obvious failure. Indeed, one would be
unlikely to acquire or to learn generosity through acts motivated in this way. The
desire to mold oneself in the image of a generous person will meet with better
success if it moves one first to imagine being a generous person and then to enact
this self-image, making believe that one is generous and using as props whatever
motives one has that can be cast in the role of generosity. (Such props might be
drawn from that fund of tenderness that Freud calls the libido.) Emulating gen-
erosity in this fashion, one comes closer to being and to feeling generous, and one
has a better chance of becoming really generous, by gradually working one’s way
into the role. One can thus gradually adopt or assume the motive of generosity in
J. David Velleman
100
7 By “a false image of oneself”, I mean a self-image that would not be true even if one enacted it.
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8 For background to this section, see “On the Aim of Belief”, in Velleman (2000a), pp. 256-72.
9 See Aristotle’s discussion at Nicomachean Ethics 1105a ff.
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a way that one never could by imitating it from the outside.
Although the desire to resemble an ideal can initiate this process only by moti-
vating a deliberate turn toward make-believe, other attitudes can initiate it direct-
ly, because they already engage the imagination. In the former case, the desire to
resemble an ideal depends for its motivational force on an assessment of how one
falls short of the ideal and what one must do to close the gap. The desire may ulti-
mately favor a process of conjuring up and enacting an idealized self-image, but
only on the basis of a realistic calculation that the process will be conducive to a
resemblance not yet attained. Now consider an attitude like respect or admiration
for the ideal. Precisely because these attitudes are not goal-oriented motives, they
tend to favor wishful thinking over purposeful activity. Admiring someone isn’t a
motive for bringing about anything in particular, and so it doesn’t call for an
instrumental calculation of the steps required to bring anything about. Wishfully
picturing oneself in the image of an ideal is not a distraction from the business of
admiring him: it is the business of admiring him. Emulation therefore flows
directly out of admiration. 
When a smoker draws on an ideal for motivation to quit, his behavior is in some
respects irrational. He ignores various facts that would be relevant to fair-minded
deliberation: the fact that he would enjoy the taste of a cigarette, that he is in habit
of smoking, that he is even now craving a smoke, and so on. And he acts instead
on various considerations that are figments of his imagination: that he feels fine
without a cigarette, that he wouldn’t enjoy one, that lighting up would be an un-
characteristic thing for him to do.
Yet his make-believe world is a world of make-believe reasons. His imagina-
tive considerations guide him in the manner of reasons for acting, just as the facts
would guide him if he acted on realistic grounds. These imaginative considera-
tions serve as narrative premises in light of which only some actions make sense
as the continuation of his story. And when an agent does what makes sense in
light of a narrative premise, or rationale, he is acting for a reason, albeit one that
isn’t true. 
What’s more, this make-believe reasoning enables the agent to become more
rational in the long run. For by pretending to be a non-smoker, he actually be-
comes a non-smoker, which is a more rational sort of person to be. As a smoker,
he was deeply conflicted: his reasons for smoking were at odds with all of his
other reasons for acting, although they were strong enough to prevail in a review
of what he had reason to do next. He therefore chose to smoke, but always at the
sacrifice of the many countervailing reasons that had been outweighed. In kick-
ing the habit, he lost his reasons for smoking, leaving the field to his counter-
vailing reasons, which can now guide his actions unopposed. Because his actual
reasons have become less conflicted, he sacrifices less in doing what he actually
has most reason to do.10 
Indeed, the agent may have had sufficient reason to identify with a non-smok-
ing ideal, even when he lacked sufficient reason to forego his next cigarette. Fore-
going his next cigarette in his story as a smoker would have left the resulting dis-
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comforts and inconveniences at center-stage, as salient repercussions to be faced.
The second act of this story would have been “The Smoker Copes with With-
drawal” – an episode that’s difficult to improvise without ending up in a third act
entitled “The Smoker’s Relapse.” The difficulty of charting an intelligible course
through the story of quitting as a smoker is what made for the rationality of con-
tinuing to smoke instead. The point of identifying with the ideal of a non-smok-
er was precisely to gain access to a different story, presenting a different set of rea-
sons. That alternative story entailed not smoking the next cigarette, of course, but
not smoking that cigarette was a different option for a non-smoker than it was for
a smoker. For a smoker, not smoking that cigarette was a matter of changing
course and facing the consequences; for a non-smoker, it was a matter of going
on as usual. To be sure, the non-smoker in this case would be a merely make-
believe non-smoker, who would experience twinges and shakes of what was in
reality nicotine withdrawal. But those discomforts would not be expected reper-
cussions to be faced and overcome; they would be inexplicable irritations to be
ignored, if possible. And the smoker who wants to quit has good reason to pre-
fer facing the consequent discomforts under the guise of irritations to be ignored
rather than expected repercussions to be faced. Hence he had good reason for
undertaking the pretense of being a non-smoker.
The smoker who wants to quit is like other agents who have reason to make
themselves temporarily irrational – warriors who have reason to work themselves
into a frenzy in order to frighten the enemy, or negotiators who have reason to
become obstinate in order to win concessions. Unlike the warrior or the negotia-
tor, however, the smoker does not have reason to arrange for something to inter-
fere with his faculty for practical reasoning. On the contrary, the irrationality that
the smoker has reason to cultivate requires the exercise of an intact deliberative
faculty; it merely requires that faculty to operate on input from the agent’s imag-
ination rather than on his knowledge of the facts. When the agent’s deliberative
faculty operates in this way, he becomes insensitive to considerations that are gen-
uine reasons for him to act, and so he becomes dispositionally irrational. And
because he thereby neglects reasons against the action that he performs, he may
end up performing an irrational action. 
I have now argued, on the one hand, that it was rational for the smoker to under-
take the activity of pretending to be a non-smoker, that this activity involved an
exercise of an intact rational faculty, and that it resulted in the smoker’s becom-
ing a more rational agent. On the other hand, I have argued that the activity of
pretending to be a non-smoker was irrational in the sense that it made the smok-
er insensitive to some of the reasons that actually applied to him, and conse-
quently led him to do something that wasn’t supported by the balance of actual
reasons.
I think that such irrationality is often involved when an agent is motivated by
a personal ideal – including the overarching ideals that embody Hume’s general
perspective or the Aristotelian virtues. Whether one is emulating an impartial
observer or a virtuous human being, one may be engaged in make-believe and
hence in an activity that’s irrational in the respects described above. 
J. David Velleman
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Note, however, that I have not included Kant’s Categorical Imperative in the
list of moral ideals whose emulation tends to require make-believe.11 The reason
is that, in my view, Kantian moral theory manages to kick away that particular
ladder. 
The Categorical Imperative is an ideal image of the will, as acting on only
those maxims which it can simultaneously will to be universal laws. But what
moves this ideal will to act only on universalizable maxims? The answer is that it
is restrained from acting on other maxims by respect for the law. And respect for
the law is just respect for the Categorical Imperative, which is an ideal image of
the will as acting only on universalizable maxims. To act out of respect for this
ideal is therefore to emulate a will that acts out of respect for the very same ideal. 
In the case of the Kantian ideal, then, emulation tends to rise to the level of
attainment. What is ideal about the person we emulate is precisely that he is
moved by an ideal, and indeed the same ideal by which we are moved. Hence to
emulate him is already and really to resemble him, and so it is unlike emulating
him with respect to a motive that doesn’t rely on emulation. To do generous
things by emulating a generous person is not yet to be generous, though it may
be a means of learning generosity. But to do the moral thing by emulating a moral
person really is to be moral, since enacting an moral image of oneself is what
being a moral person consists in.
So we are not enacting a false conception of ourselves in emulating the Cate-
gorical Imperative, because we are making that conception true just by emulating
it. Of course, we could get carried away with enacting that self-conception, by los-
ing sight of our countervailing motives, so that they lapse into abeyance for want
of reinforcement from our self-conception. Wouldn’t we then be acting on a false
self-conception and hence irrationally? Not necessarily. After all, the Categorical
Imperative could be – come to think of it, I’m sure that it is –the image of a will
that gets carried away with enacting that very self-image. The motivational divi-
sion that underlies make-believe – the division between enacted motives and
motives that externally modify such enactments – remains essential to our acting
on the Categorical Imperative; but what gets enacted is not a false self-conception. 
Insofar as we are Kantian moral agents, then, we are not just pretending.
When we dream of our morally better selves, our dreams really can come true.
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